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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
UNITED STATES v. CBS: WHEN SKETCH ARTISTS
ARE ALLOWED IN THE COURTROOM, CAN
PHOTOGRAPHERS BE FAR BEHIND?
In United States v. CBS,' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals con-
sidered the question of whether the sketching of judicial proceedings
by an artist for publication in connection with a news broadcast may
be prohibited in the interest of preventing prejudicial publicity. The
court held that a blanket prohibition of publication of sketches, regard-
less of whether they were made in the courtroom or elsewhere, was
"too remotely related to the danger sought to be avoided" and "too
broadly drawn to withstand constitutional scrutiny."'2 In addition, the
court held that, in the absence of a showing that sketching was obtru-
sive or disruptive, a blanket prohibition of sketching within the court-
room was constitutionally impermissible as an overbroad limitation of
first amendment rights.3
The analysis of the CBS court represents a departure from the
traditional concept of the extent to which judicial authority may be ex-
ercised to control the conduct of the press in the courtroom and its
environs. In tacitly extending a clear and present danger test as a lim-
itation upon judicial authority to control conduct of the press within the
courtroom, the Fifth Circuit may have inadvertently exposed a basic
flaw in the rationale which has supported prohibitions against the taking
of photographs in the courtroom for more than a quarter of a century.
Further, the holding in CBS, considered together with the prohibitions
against the making of photographs contained in Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 534 and its philosophical companion, Canon 3A(7)
of the Code of Judicial Conduct,5 makes possible the following anom-
1. 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974).
2. Id. at 106.
3. Id. at 107. The court's assumption that sketching is protected by the first
amendment is implied by its citation of Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
499-502 (1952), in which case the Supreme Court held that expression by means of mo-
tion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guarantees of the first and
fourteenth amendments. See 497 F.2d at 105.
4. The rule provides: "The taking of photographs in the court room during the
progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the
court room shall not be permitted by the court." FED. R. CalM. P. 53.
5. This subdivision of Canon 3 provides:
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alous result: Highly inflammatory, subjective sketches of judicial pro-
ceedings could be published while relatively objective photographs of
the same subject could not even be taken.
The controversy in CBS arose when a CBS news artist attended
the pretial hearing of the "Gainesville Eight"6 in July 1973, at which
time federal district court Judge Arnow7 announced that he would
not permit any sketches of the proceedings to be made for publica-
tion irrespective of where the sketches were actually made. The artist
did not take sketching materials into the courtroom, but sketched the
proceedings from memory. After four of the sketches were tele-
vised on the CBS Morning News, CBS was found guilty of criminal
contempt for having defied the district court order." Both CBS and
NBC sought writs of mandamus to require the district court judge to
vacate those parts of his written orders which restricted sketching,' and
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photo-
graphs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions
of court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may authorize:
(a) the use of electronic or photograpic means for the presentation of
evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes of judicial
administration;
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of investi-
tive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings;
(c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of appro-
priate court proceedings under the following conditions:(i) the means of recording will not distract participants or impair the
dignity of the proceedings;
(ii) the parties have consented, and the consent to being depicted or
recorded has been obtained from each witness appearing in the re-
cording and reproduction;
(iii) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the proceeding
has been concluded and all direct appeals have been exhausted; and
(iv) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instruction purposes
in educational institutions. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUcT, Canon
No. 3A(7).
The Code was adopted in 1972 by a unanimous vote of the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association. Although the Canon reflects the contemporary concern for
"instructional" use of technology, it implicitly restricts the discretion of the court and
is consistent with its forerunner, ABA Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. See
E. TsoDE, REPoRTE's NoTm TO CODE OF JuDIcAJ CoNDucr (1973). Canon 35 is set
out in note 72 infra.
6. The "Gainesville Eight" were accused of conspiring to disrupt the Republican
National Convention in 1972.
7. Judge Arnow, of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida, sits in Pensacola, Florida.
8. The appeal from the criminal contempt conviction was considered in a separate
opinion, United States v. CBS, 497 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1974).
9. The order issued on July 13 provided:
During the progress of or in connection with any judicial proceedings now
or hereafter pending before the undersigned ...sketching in the courtroom
or its environs, whether or not court is actually in session, is prohibited.
This order extends to and prohibits the publication of any sketch of the
courtroom or its environs or any proceedings therein, regardless of the place
where such sketch is made, United States v. CBS, 497 F.2d 102, 103-04 (5th
Cir. 1974).
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CBS appealed the contempt conviction.
Judge Dyer, writing for the court in CBS, defined the issues as
follows:
First we must examine the constitutionality of the order banning the
publication of sketches, regardless of whether the sketches were made
in the courtroom, its environs, or elsewhere. Then we must consider
the prohibition on sketching itself in -the courtroom or its environs during
any judicial proceedings.' 0
The court's perception of the dual nature of the issues presented
in CBS stems in part from the dichotomous nature of the contempt
power: courts generally have greater discretion in punishing direct
contempt, i.e., conduct within the presence of the court," whereas
power to punish conduct not in the presence of the court is more re-
stricted.' 2 The contempt power is statutorily restricted in the federal
courts,'" and judicial authority to punish an act of contempt manifested
by publication is further limited by the right of freedom of expression.' 4
The court noted that this order was intended to supplement Local Rule 16, which
proscribes radio and television broadcasting from the courtroom. There is a hint that
the Fifth Circuit might have avoided the constitutional issues presented in the case since
the order was improperly promulgated, there being no indication that a copy of the
amendment had been sent to the Supreme Court as is required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 83. Id. at 103 n.3.
10. Id. at 104.
11. The distinction is actually between conduct within the "presence" of the court
"or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice" and conduct removed
from the presence of the court or from affecting the administration of justice. See note
13 infra. The words "so near thereto" have been strictly limited in the context of at-
tempts to control the press. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). Before
CBS, there appeared to be a consensus that the courtroom and its environs on the same
floor were included in that area over which the judiciary might exercise greater discre-
tion in controlling the conduct of the press. See Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558
(7th Cir. 1970).
12. Contempt of court has been the subject of a substantial amount of commentary.
See, e.g., Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 183 (1971); Com-
ment, Civil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 57 YALE L.J. 83 (1947).
13. The statute provides:
A court of the United States shall have the power to punish by fine or impris-
onment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, de-
cree or command. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
14. See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947) (freedom of speech should
not be impaired unless there is a serious and imminent threat to the administration of
justice); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946) (freedom of speech should
be given the widest latitude compatible with fair and orderly administration of justice);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268 (1941) (freedom of speech guarantees are ap-
plicable in contempt proceedings to out-of-court publications concerning a pending case).
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The general rule is that the press can be punished for conduct outside
the presence of the court only in the event that such conduct presents
a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. 15 Although
the CBS court stated the issues of the case in a manner which implic-
itly recognized the distinction between the extent of judicial authority
to control conduct depending upon the location of its occurrence, the
court's ultimate resolution of the issues eroded that distinction.
The court began its analysis by acknowledging the affirmative
duty of the trial judge to maintain a dispassionate forum as an essential
element of a fair -trial6 and then focused on the duty of the trial judge
to safeguard the guarantees of the sixth amendment and the due pro-
cess clause of the Constitution. This emphasis on the duty of the trial
judge to protect the defendant from prejudicial publicity suggests that
judicial authority to invoke its contempt power to control conduct de-
rives at least in part from the substantive rights of the defendant to
an impartial trial." Significantly, in CBS the defendants in the trial
to which the press sought access made no complaint of prejudicial treat-
ment at the hands of the press, but themselves actively sought public-
ity.- 8  This fact serves to emphasize the real question presented by the
CBS case: to what extent may judicial authority be exercised to
restrict news-gathering techniques where there is no complaint by the
accused of prejudicial treatment by the press?'9
The Fifth Circuit accepted without question the right of the press
15. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), first applied the "clear and present
danger" language of Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), to a case involving
contempt by publication. 314 U.S. at 260-63.
16. The duty of the trial judge to insure a fair trial by restraining the press from
disrupting the proceedings is mandated by Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966),
and by Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). The affirmative duty of the judge to re-
strain the defendant from disrupting the proceedings is mandated by Illinois v. Allen,
397 U.S. 337 (1970).
17. Cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
18. The trial judge noted in a statement accompanying the order that the defendants
were "trying to place before the public, including persons who are potential jurors, their
own version of the merits of the case." 497 F.2d at 104. He accused the defendants
of cultivating prejudicial publicity by their assertions that the prosecution was politically
motivated. See id.
19. In CBS, the defendants in the case to which the press sought access joined in
the request that the sketching be allowed. Brief for Appellant at 2, United States v.
CBS, 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974). There appears to be no question that in certain
circumstances the accused may have media representatives excluded. See United States
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 274 F. Supp. 790, 793 (W.D. Pa.),
rev'd on other grounds, 388 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 922 (1968);
State v. Meek, 9 Ariz. App. 149, 150-54, 450 P.2d 115, 116-20, cert. denied, 396 U.S.
847 (1969).
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to attend the court proceedings.20  In United States v. Dickinson,21
Judge Brown stated:
We start, of course, with the proposition Tepeatedly reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court that "a trial is a public event. What transpires in the
courtroom is public property .... Those who see and hear what hap-
pened may report it with impunity. There is no special perquisite of
the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other institutions
of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which -tran-
spire in proceedings before it.1' 2 2
The CBS court cited Dickinson with approval, observing:
That case stands for the proposition that before a prior restraint may
be imposed by a judge, even in the interest of assuring a fair trial,
-there must be "an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the admin-
istration of justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable,
it must immediately imperil." 23
The CBS court specifically rejected the government's contention
that because the ban on sketching involved only a minor restriction,
the ban should be allowed. The court refused to apply a sliding scale
of measuring first amendment rights according to the degree of re-
straint imposed.24  Observing that the Kaufman Committee 25 had
20. It is important to note that the CBS case did not involve any examination of
the right of the press to attend courtroom proceedings, nor did it reach any question
with respect to the right of the press to obtain access to news sources. The right of
access and right to gather problems were recently considered by the Supreme Court in
the context of prison interviews in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 829-35 (1974),
and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 846-50 (1974). While the Supreme
Court concluded that the rights of the press were coextensive with the rights of the gen-
eral public with respect to access to news sources, the CBS court did not consider the
issue since neither the press nor the public was excluded from the proceedings.
21. 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972). This case arose out of an attempt by a civil
rights worker to get the federal court to block his trial in state court. During a hearing
on whether the state prosecutorial motive was legitimate, the federal trial judge ordered
the press not to make any report of the testimony taken in the case because he believed
that publicity would prejudice the state proceedings that were likely to take place later.
Id. at 500. When two newsmen reported the testimony in violation of the order and
were found guilty of criminal contempt, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the order was
constitutionally invalid, but that the newsmen could be punished for violating even an
invalid order. Id. at 509. The case was remanded for the district court to decide if
the contempt judgment was still appropriate in light of the fact that the order was uncon-
stitutional.
22. Id. at 501, quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
23. 497 F.2d at 104, quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947).
24. 497 F.2d at 105.
25. See REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEMS ON THE
FREE-PRESS-FAn' TRIAL IsSUE, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1968). The report was the product
of the Kaufman Committee, which was chaired by Irving R. Kaufman, presently Chief
Judge of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
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warned against restraint of the press,26 the CBS court declined to hold
that sketches were among those "unnecessary dramatizations" which
would threaten the impartiality of proceedings sufficiently to warrant
their prohibition.2T Equally fruitless was the government's attempt to
persuade the court that sketching should be prohibited because of the
potentially prejudicial "awareness" of the trial participants that the pro-
ceedings were being sketchedY.2  The court was not convinced that
"being sketched for later publication can be equated with the uniquely
prejudicial impact of telecasting." 29  Focusing on the problem of dis-
traction occasioned by television, as noted by the Supreme Court in
Estes v. Texas,80 Judge Dyer observed that sketching, unlike televising,
could be done "quite unobtrusively."31  Although the court agreed
with the Court's comment in Estes that the psychological considerations
of being televised have significant impact, it declined to impute the
same effect to sketching. The court noted that the televising of court-
room procedures is nearly universally condemned, while sketching is
restricted in only a few jurisdictions. 2 The CBS court concluded by
observing that "the total ban on the publication of sketches is too re-
motely related to the danger sought to be avoided, and is, moreover,
too broadly drawn to withstand constitutional scrutiny,"' 3 for "it is basic
constitutional law that the limitation can be no broader than necessary
to accomplish the desired goal."34
The Fifth Circuit next considered the second issue in the case-
whether an order prohibiting in-court sketching was valid. Judge Dyer
26. The Kaufman Committee was not consistent with its warning, however, in advis-
ing against restraint of the press. Its recommendations included prohibition of pho-
tography and broadcasting in the courtroom. Id. at 401, 414-15.
27. 497 F.2d at 105.
28. Id. "It is the awareness of the fact of telecasting that is felt by the juror
throughout the trial. We are all self-conscious and uneasy when being televised." Estes
v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 546 (1964).
29. 497 F.2d at 105.
30. 381 U.S. 532 (1965). In his concurring opinion Chief Justice Warren ob-
served: "The right of communications media to comment on court proceedings does not
bring with it the right to inject themselves into the fabric of the trial process to alter
the purpose of that process." Id. at 585.
31. 497 F.2d at 107. The New Jersey Supreme Court reached the same conclusion
and agreed to modify its Canon 35 in order to permit an artist to sketch the proceeding
so long as the artist works unobtrusively and does not distract the attention of witnesses
or jurors. Application of NBC, 64 N.J. 476, 317 A.2d 695 (1974).
32. 497 F.2d at 106. Only three of eighty federal district courts with written rules
restrict sketching by forbidding the sketching as well as photographing of jurors. This
restriction only applies to widely publicized cases and is intended to preserve the
anonymity of the jurors.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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briefly acknowledged the greater power of the trial judge in dealing
with conduct of those within the presence of the court vis-h-vis the
more restricted power of the trial judge in dealing with those outside
the court's presence. The court observed that "[o]rdinarily, the trial
judge has extremely broad discretion to control courtroom activity, even
when the restriction touches on matters protected by the First Amend-
ment. . .. ,"3 However, it quickly concluded that in the absence of
a showing that "sketching is in any way obtrusive or disruptive,"36 the
prohibition against sketching was "overly broad and thus invalid. 3 In
so holding, the CBS court tacitly applied the clear and present danger
standard as a limitation upon judicial authority to control conduct and
shifted the inquiry from the authority of the judiciary to control court-
room conduct to the protection of the rights of the press. This dramatic
change of emphasis is best illustrated by an examination of the Fifth
Circuits opinion in Seymour v. United States,8 which the CBS court
cited with approval.
In Seymour, the Fifth Circuit considered a challenge to a standing
order of the district court which prohibited the taking of photographs
"in connection with any judicial proceeding on or from the same floor
of the building on which courtrooms are located . . ... 3 Seymour,
a television news photographer, was found guilty of contempt for hav-
ing taken television photographs of a defendant and his attorney in the
hallway outside a courtroom40 from which the defendant was being led
following arraignment proceedings. Seymour did not question the con-
stitutionality of the practice of excluding television photographers from
the courtroom, but he contended that the court's order was "fatally
vague because of its failure to define whether or not it applies to a
terminated judicial proceeding .. ". .""I Further, he asserted that
"because the arraignment proceedings had terminated when he took
the photographs, any reasonable relation the order may have had to
the maintenance of orderly judicial administration was negated."42
The court rejected both of these contentions,48 noting that the
federal contempt statute authorizes use of the contempt power by the
35. Id. at 106-07, citing Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967).
36. 497 F.2d at 107.
37. Id.
38. 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967).
39. Id. at 630 n.1.
40. For a general discussion of what constitutes contempt in the presence of the
court, see note 11 supra and accompanying text.
41. 373 F.2d at 631.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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court to punish "[d]isobdience or resistance to its lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree or command." Judge Thornberry, writing for the
court in Seymour, minimized considerations of first amendment issues
and emphasized the right of the accused to a fair trial "as the only rele-
vant constitutional consideration.' '4n The court refused to consider the
question of prior restraint and neglected to inquire into the lawfulness
of the order in terms of the rights of the press, suggesting that a dis-
tinction could be drawn between the right of the press to report the
news and the privilege of gathering the news. However, no elabora-
tion of that distinction, nor any citation to authority, was given in the
opinion.46  Furthermore, this court, unlike the CBS court,47 failed to
analyze the order to see if it might not be broader than was necessary
to achieve the desired effect. Nevertheless, the court did note that
the Third Circuit had considered the constitutional validity of a similar
order proscribing photography from the courtroom and its environs in
Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas,48 but Judge Thornberry did
not embrace that court's unique approach of denying that any issue of
freedom of expression was presented.49 Having limited the extent of
its inquiry into the first amendment issue, although not denying its ex-
istence, the Seymour court abruptly concluded:
[W]e are convinced that the order before us falls within the ambit of
permissible maintenance of judicial decorum and represents a reason-
able implementation of the due-process mandate to preserve at all costs
an atmosphere essential to "the most fundamental of all freedoms"
-a fair trial.56
44. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970). For the fall text of the relevant statutory provision,
see note 13 supra.
45. 373 F.2d at 632 (emphasis in original), quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,
589 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
46. The distinction between gathering and reporting news was made in Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), in which the Supreme Court held that requiring news-
men to appear and testify does not abridge the freedoms of speech and press guaranteed
by the first amendment. The Court observed: "INjor is it suggested that news gather-
ing does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seek-
ing out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id. at 681. For further
discussion of the distinction between the rights of the press to gather and to report the
news, see note 20 supra.
47. See 497 F.2d at 106.
48. 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958). See also 57 MIcH. L. REv. 280 (1958).
49. The Tribune court stated:
Realizing that we are not dealing with freedom of expression at all, but with
rules having to do with gaining access to information on matters of public in-
terest, can it be argued that here there is some constitutional right for every-
body not to be interfered with in finding things about everybody else? 254
F.2d at 885.
See also United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
50. 373 F.2d at 632, citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
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In short, the Seymour court focused on considerations of judicial au-
thority to the exclusion of first amendment issues.
The later decisions of the Fifth Circuit-Dickinson and CBS-
appeared to afford greater protection to the rights of the press. An
emphasis on the high standard of the clear and present danger test,
along with a requirement that restraints be narrowly drawn, is manifest
in those decisions. The same protective philosophy led the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Dorfman v. Meiszner,51 to declare invalid
a rule prohibiting photography and radio and television broadcasting
in a building which served both as a courthouse and federal office
building.5 2  In Dorfman, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the Chicago
press that the prohibition was overbroad in its description of the environs
to which it applied.53 The challenge to the rule was not directed at
its application within the courtroom itself, and the specific question of
the constitutionality of a rule prohibiting photography within the court-
room was not presented. The Seventh Circuit, however, announced
that the district court might by rule exclude photography and broad-
casting from those areas in "which [they] would lead to disruption or
distraction of judicial proceedings . . . ,,54 In dictum, the Dorfman
court observed that "the district court was acting within its discretion
in prohibiting photography and broadcasting inside as well as in the
areas adjacent to the courtrooms." 55  The court offered no indication
of the basis for its dictum, but it is clear that some courts have relied
on one or both of two related arguments in upholding the validity of
51. 430 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1970).
52. This district court rule, promulgated September 1969, provided in pertinent part:
The taking of photographs in the courtroom or its environs or radio or televi-
sion broadcasting from the courtroom or its environs, during the progress of
or in connection with judicial proceedings, including proceedings before a
United States Commissioner, whether or not court is actually in session, is pro-
hibited. rd. at 560.
In Dorfman, the Seventh Circuit rejected an argument advanced by the government that
because the rule would actually be enforced in much more limited circumstances than
its literal terms might suggest, it should be allowed to stand. Id. at 563. Citing
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963), the court said, "We cannot assume that
in subsequent enforcement, ambiguities will be resolved in favor of adequate protection
of First Amendment rights .... Moreover, we do not think that the use of the con-
junctive rather than the disjunctive would save the rule." 430 F.2d at 563 n.6.
53. Although the prohibition of photography and televising did not apply to all
twenty-seven occupied floors of the building, it did extend to an enclosed plaza and side-
walks surrounding the courthouse and included floors which had no connection with ju-
dicial proceeding. The court observed that one of the effects of the rule was to prevent
a United States senator whose office was on the eighteenth floor of the building from
holding press conferences during those periods when court was in session. 430 F.2d
at 562.
54. Id. at 561 (emphasis added).
.Id. It 562,
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orders restricting the use of photographic equipment in and around the
courtroom. 56
The first of these arguments is the traditional theory of inherent
judicial authority to control conduct in the courtroom and its surround-
ings. 5s Both Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 535& and Canon
3A(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct59 rest upon this theory of in-
herent judicial authority. The second argument in favor of prohibiting
photography-that such restrictions are mandated as a matter of due
process by the Supreme Court holdings in Estes v. Texas60 and
Sheppard v. Maxwell 6'-is based upon an interpretation of those cases
which has by no means achieved universal acceptance. 62  Neither of
these arguments is more than superficially concerned with first amend-
ment considerations of the rights of freedom of expression and freedom
of the press. Courts which have employed these arguments do not
speak in terms of the clear and present danger standard,63 nor have
these courts applied the rule that restrictions upon first amendment
rights must be narrowly drawn.64 Each of the arguments assumes the
validity of the highly questionable premise that the taking of courtroom
photographs is inherently obtrusive or disruptive.66
56. See Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967); In re Acuff, 331
F. Supp. 819 (D.N.M. 1971).
57. In Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924), the Court observed, "That
the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts has been many times decided
and may be regarded as settled law." Id. at 65.
58. See note 4 supra.
59. See note 5 supra.
60. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
61. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
62. See notes 75-78 infra and accompanying text.
63. E.g., Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967); In re Acuff, 331
F. Supp. 819 (D.N.M. 1971).
64. Compare United States v. CBS, 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974), and Dorfman
v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1970), with Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d
629 (5th Cir. 1967), and Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d
Cir. 1958).
65. For an early case which did not accept the inherent disruptiveness of courtroom
photography, see Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 123, 136 A. 312, 315 (Ct. App. 1927),
where the court stated that the ability of a photographer to take a picture in court with-
out noise or distraction is no reason to allow disobedience to a judicial order forbidding
it. Id. at 123, 136 A. at 315. The Sturm case was decided twenty years before it was
announced that "[w]hat transpires in the courtroom is public property." Craig v. Har-
ney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). The Sturm decision, at least in part, rested on the now
generally discarded theory of the privacy rights of the defendant. For a discussion of
this theory, see the majority and dissenting opinions in In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126
A.2d 679 (1956). Today, the right of privacy of the defendant is diminished by the
public interest in his case. See Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1946);
Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948). A defend-
ant' right to exclude the publiQ and the press is dependent not upon his right of privacy,
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53, which prohibits photo-
graphing and radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings, was adopted
in 1946.6 In 1962, the Judicial Conference of the United States
adopted a resolution67 in which it recommended broadening the scope
of the original rule to exclude any type of broadcaster 8 from the en-
virons of the courtroom as well as from the courtroom itself.6 9 While
the constitutionality of Rule 53 in the face of first amendment challenges
has been assumed, 0 the question appears never to have been directly
at issue, and no court has felt compelled to reach it.71  The existence
of the rule and its assumed constitutionality has supported the adoption
of orders by state and federal courts restricting the use of photography
pursuant to Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, and subse-
quently, pursuant to Canon 3A(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.72
One probable explanation for the general acceptance of the constitu-
tionality of the rule is that shortly before its adoption the judiciary
exercised more discretion in its use of the contempt power for control-
ling the press.73  While limitations upon a court's authority to punish
the press for out-of-court conduct were well recognized, it was not until
but upon his right to a fair trial. People v. Pratt, 27 App. Div. 2d 199, 199-202, 278
N.Y.S.2d 89, 90-93 (1967); see People v. Holder, 70 Misc. 2d 31, 33, 332 N.Y.S.2d 933,
935 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
66. 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AN PROCEDUrRE § 861, at 376 (1969). For
the text of Rule 53, see note 4 supra.
67. See 1962 ABA ANUAL REP. OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUD. CONF. OF THE
UNITED STATES 10. The Resolution has been implemented in a number of jurisdictions
by local rule. 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 66, § 861, at 377.
68. The original rule did not extend to television broadcasters. See note 4 supra.
69. See 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 66, § 861, at 377.
70. 'See id.
71. In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), the Supreme Court referred to both
Rule 53 and Canon 35, but the specific question of the constitutional legitimacy of the
policy of excluding photographers from the courtroom was not presented. Interestingly,
in CBS it was contended by the network that the case did not involve a challenge to
Rule 53. Brief for Appellant at 17, United States v. CBS, 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974).
72. Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics was adopted in 1937 and amended
in 1952. It provides in pertinent part:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum.
The taking of photographs in the court room, during sessions of the court or
recesses between sessions and the broadcasting or televising of court proceedings
are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, distract
the witness in giving his testimony, degrade the court, and create misconcep-
tions with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be per-
mitted. ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS No. 35 (1952).
The Canons were adopted in most jurisdictions. See E. TRIODE, supra note 5, at 5.
73. Only recently have the courts recognized that the right to a public trial belongs
to members of the general public who wish to attend the trial as well as to the accused.
See United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 274 F. Supp. 790
(W.D. Pa. 1967). But see Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 361 US. 842 (1959).
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1947 that the Supreme Court recognized that the proceedings in a
courtroom were public property.74 Although the rule and its kindred
orders have survived uncontested, it is doubtful that they could with-
stand the level of scrutiny applied in CBS. If one adopts the clear and
present danger test and the principle that restrictions must be narrowly
drawn, the current blanket restrictions prohibiting photography in the
courtroom appear to be impermissibly broad in scope.
The second argument in support of prohibiting courtroom photo-
graphy-that such restrictions are either approved or mandated by the
Supreme Court in Estes and Sheppard-is as vulnerable as the theory
of unlimited judicial discretion. There can be no doubt that Estes and
Sheppard stand for an affirmative duty on the part of a trial judge to
preserve the dignity and impartiality of the proceedings. However, the
Court did not give a definitive mandate for the exclusion of television
and broadcasting equipment, let alone for the exclusion of photograph-
ers, since only four of the five Justices in favor of reversing the con-
viction in Estes were willing to pronounce the televising of proceedings
a per se deprivation of due process. 75  The Estes Court did state that
a different case would be presented when advances in technology
permitted televising without its "present hazards to a fair trial.176
In Sheppard, the Court noted that "[w]here there was 'no threat or
menace to the integrity of the trial,' . . . we have consistently required
that the press have a free hand, even though we sometimes deplored
its sensationalism."77  The circumstances surrounding the Estes and
Sheppard cases make it clear that the constitutionally objectionable
factor in each case was the level of publicity and disruption occasioned
by members of the press. In each case, a carnival atmosphere reigned,
making a fair trial impossible. 78
74. Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947); see Nelles & King, Contempt by
Publication in the United States, 28 COLUM. L. Rav. 401 (1928).
75. The fact that only four of the Justices constituting the majority in Estes were
willing to find that courtroom photography constituted a per se due process violation
was pointed out by the dissent of Justice Brennan. 381 U.S. at 617. The four Justices
who agreed that televising criminal proceedings was unconstitutional were Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Clark, Douglas, and Goldberg. Id.
76. Id. at 540.
77. 384 U.S. at 350 (citation omitted).
78. The atmosphere surrounding the Sheppard trial prompted the following com-
ment by Judge Bell of the Ohio Supreme Court: "Murder and mystery, society, sex and
suspense were combined in this case in such a manner as to intrigue and captivate the
public fancy to a degree perhaps unparalleled in recent annals." State v. Sheppard, 165
Ohio St. 293, 294, 135 N.E.2d 340, 342 (1956), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Shep-
pard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
In Estes, it was conceded that the activities of the television crews and news pho-
tographers led to considerable disruption of the hearings. On one occasion, videotapes
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Perhaps because it is difficult -to conceive of a televised trial -which
would not have similar prejudicial and disruptive impact, 79 courts have
sometimes cited Estes as holding that the televising of criminal trials
constitutes an inherent denial of due process. In Bell v. Patterson,
a district court which subscribed to this interpretation of Estes"' distin-
guished televising from still photography, saying that the reasons for
holding television inherently prejudicial do not apply to still photo-
graphy. Among the reasons listed for this distinction were the court's
finding that televising a trial automatically renders it a cause cjldbre,8 2
that limited photography does not cause the uneasiness nor the disrup-
tion which television causes,83 and that televising tends to work
profound changes on behavior which photography does not.84 In addi-
tion, the court found that the danger presented by television in
exposing the jury to detailed scrutiny did not arise with the allowance
of limited photography. 85
The rationale of the Bell court in distinguishing televising from
still photography bears a striking similarity to the analysis of the CBS
court in its comparison of televising and sketching. While the Bell
court held that the unobtrusive making of still photographs in the court-
room was not a per se deprivation of defendant's due process rights,'
the CBS court in effect concluded that the only acceptable justification
for limiting the conduct of the press would be that such conduct pre-,
sented a clear and present danger to the orderly administration of jus-
tice and to the rights of the accused.8 6 The apparent combined effect
of these decisions is to put still photography on an equal footing with
sketching for purposes of determining the extent of allowable restraints
upon the press within the courtroom and its environs.
By making the judicial determination that sketching should be
of the hearings on motions to exclude the press were rebroadcast in place of the "late
movie." 381 U.S. at 538.
79. Both Estes and Sheppard dealt not only with the impact of the presence of the
press within the courtroom, but also with the impact of publicity on the jury. The Court
found as a matter of fact, in each case, that the defendant had been prejudiced by the
publicity and that the interference of the press had surpassed the level required to justify
the exercise of judicial contempt power.
80. 279 F. Supp. 760 (D. Colo.), aff'd on other grounds, 402 F.2d 394 (10th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 955 (1971).
81. See 279 F. Supp. at 769.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. There seems no question that disruptive conduct may warrant exclusion of spec-
tators, United States v, Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949),
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allowed unless it is obtrusive,8 7 the CBS court may have unwittingly
extended an invitation to photographers to challenge the constitution-
ality of blanket orders prohibiting them from taking photographs in the
courtroom and its environs. If, where there is neither a need to protect
the anonymity of the jury nor an objection by the defendant,8 8 a news-
man's right to attend and report on judicial proceedings is qualified only
where his conduct presents a clear and present danger to the admin-
istration of justice,89 the question arises as to how the courts may sustain
the constitutionality of the prohibition against photography while reject-
ing the ban on sketching. Courts have not revealed what is inherent
in the nature of photography which is of a sufficient constitutional
dimension to distinguish it from sketching. 0
As was noted by the Bell court, courtroom photography is not in-
herently obtrusive.91 One state supreme court judge has posed the
question: "How can there be an 'obstructing the administration of
justice, when the act compained of cannot be seen, heard or felt?"92
Although it might be supposed that the art of photography has only
recently reached the point of sophistication making it possible to photo-
graph unobstrusively, a 1927 decision revealed that newsman were
secretly making photographs in court nearly half a century ago.9 3  In
1956, the Supreme Court of Colorado refused to adopt Canon 35 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics94 and approved a report of a referee who
stated, "Canon 35 assumes the fact to be that the use of camera...
instruments must in every case interfere with the administration of
justice." 9 The referee was convinced that those supporting continuance
87. 497 F.2d at 107; accord Application of NBC, 64 N.J. 476, 317 A.2d 695.
(1974).
88. See note 19 supra.
89. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
90. In Estes, the Court rejected an argument that permitting newspapermen in the
courtroom while forbidding radio and television broadcasters presented a question of
equal protection. The Court pointed to the obtrusiveness of the equipment accompany-
ing broadcasters as the distinguishing feature. 381 U.S. at 540. If photographers can
be as unobtrusive as sketch artists, it would appear, after CBS, that a challenge to the
proscription of photography based on equal protection grounds would be difficult to
overcome. See In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,
132 Colo. 591, 296 P.2d 465 (1956).
91. 279 F. Supp. at 769.
92. In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 285, 126 A.2d 679, 695 (1956) (Musmanno, J., dis-
senting). The majority of the court upheld the rule forbidding the taking of photo-
graphs on the ground that it bore "a reasonable relation to the aim sought"-mainte-
nance of the dignity and decorum of the court for the orderly administration of justice.
Id. at 258, 126 A.2d at 682.
93. See Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 A. 312 (Ct. App. 1927).
94. For the text of Canon 35, see note 72 supra.
95. In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 132
Colo. 591, 596, 296 P.2d 465, 468 (1956).
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of Canon 3500 had "failed, neglected, or refused to expose themselves
to the information, evidence and demonstrations of progress" available
in the field.17
The ability to photograph unobtrusively and the holding in CBS
cast considerable doubt on the viability of a rule which excludes all
photographers from the courtroom. Of course, the problem lies not
in allowing a few photographers to make photographs inconspicuously.
The real difficulty arises from the faot that once photographers are
again allowed in the courtroom and its environs, new lines will have
to be drawn to circumscribe the permissible limits of obtrusiveness. 9
The ultimate result of the courts' providing new standards of obtrusive-
ness conceivably could be a shift from the clear and present danger
standard and the necessity enunciated in CBS of drawing restrictions
narrowly"0 to a standard less protective of the rights of the press.
In the past, courts have sustained restrictions imposed upon the
conduct of the press within the courtroom if such restrictions bore a
reasonable relation to the maintenance of the order and decorum of
the court.'00 Clearly, the "reasonable relation" standard allows for
greater judicial discretion than does the clear and present danger
standard. However, there is a possibility that the courts might redefine
the rights of the press by applying the "probability of prejudice" test
applied by the Supreme Court in Rideau v. Louisiana.'"' In that case,
the United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction on the grounds
that the evidence showed the probability of prejudice to the rights of
the defendant by the conduct of the press. The case represented a
departure from the Court's earlier approach of examining the particular
facts of the case before it in order to determine if prejudice actually
96. For a sample of the debate over Canon 35, see Miller, Wiggins, & Tinkham,
Should Canon 35 Be Amended?-A Symposium, 42 A.B.A.J. 834 (1956).
97. In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 132
Colo. 591, 596, 296 P.2d 465, 468 (1956). The referee's comments and the Colorado
Supreme Court's adoption of his views extended not only to still photography but also
to television.
98. It is likely that the court would use a press pool arrangement if there was wide-
spread interest in the case. (Of course, none of the photographers would be allowed to
use flash attachments.)
99. See Warren & Abell, Free Press-Fair Trial: The "Gag Order," A California
Aberration, 45 S. CAL. L. Rav. 51 (1972).
100. See Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967); Tribune Review
Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958); In re Acuff, 331 F. Supp. 819
(D.N.M. 1971); In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956).
101. 373 U.S. 723 (1963); accord, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Tur-
ner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); see 21 Sw. L.J. 560 (1967). See also Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-44 (1965).
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resulted.10 2  If the mere probability of prejudice is sufficient to justify
reversal of a conviction, it is possible that the probability of prejudice
may be deemed sufficient grounds for controlling the press from the
outset, both within and outside the courtroom. The following comment
by the Supreme Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell has a particularly omin-
ous ring with respect to the problem of prior restraint on the press:
"Reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures
that will prevent the prejudice at its inception.' 0°8  In view of the facts
of the Sheppard case, which dealt not only with in-court conduct of
the press but also with publication of prejudicial materials, it would ap-
pear that the "probability of prejudice" standard could be applied to
broaden the parameters of judicial discretion at the expense of the
rights of the press both within and outside the courtroom. 0 4
In order to avoid a redefinition of the rights of the press and to
avoid potential litigation on the issue, the courts must formulate
a clear distinction between the making of photographs and the making
of sketches. The CBS court offers one, albeit weak, distinction:
photography in the courtroom, like broadcasting, is nearly universally
condemned. 10 5 Even if the current widespread exclusion of news
photographers is some justification for contending that due process con-
templates such an exclusion, 0 6 the popularity of a rule is a poor con-
stitutional ground for sustaining it. Indeed, it may be persuasively
argued that the "consensus" approach often takes on the appearance
of a purely rhetorical device.0 7 The CBS court might have embraced
a distinction based on the differences between mechanical and non-
mechanical equipment, allowing sketching but excluding photography,
but it is doubtful that such an artificial distinction could conceal the
underlying constitutional issues.' 08 Another approach would have
102. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181
(1952).
103. 384 U.S. at 363.
104. See Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967).
105. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 580-83 & nn.38-39 (1965). See also In re
Acuff, 331 F. Supp. 819 (D.N.M. 1971).
106. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 581-83 (1965), citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 651 (1961).
107. That general approval or disapproval of a practice is not an acid test of due
process can be seen in the following cases: In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954),
the Supreme Court announced that segregation, then a widespread practice, was viola-
tive of due process. In Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), the Supreme Court,
after noting the historical background of the generally approved practice of requiring
an unanimous jury verdict for conviction, announced that unanimity was not within the
mandates of the due process clause.
108. See note 90 supra.
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been to focus on the different effects achieved by the use of photography
and sketching; although sketches are broadcast and reprinted in news-
papers in the same manner as photographs, it might be argued that
sketches are by their nature sufficiently subjective to put their viewers
on notice that they are not accurate reproductions of the image of
the subject. The suggestion is that sketches are not taken as seriously
by the viewing public and hence do not have as much of an impact on
formulating public opinion as do photographs. 10 9
Another possible basis for distinguishing sketching from photog-
raphy is the number of practitioners; while few persons can sketch,
many members of the general public own cameras. Since the rights
of the press in the courtroom seem to be only coextensive with those
of the general public, 110 the argument might be made that if the press
is allowed to photograph in the courtroom, the same privilege must be
allowed to members of the general public. Because the presence and
use of numerous cameras would almost invariably be obtrusive, it is
likely that a court would validly proscribe photography, basing its de-
cision on "equal proscription" grounds. Alternatively, a court could
restrict courtroom photography to members of the press by extending
a limited privilege to the press beyond the rights of the public. Indeed,
at least one court has hinted that this is a possible and advisable ap-
proach, saying: "1n public meetings, including trials, the right of the
press to be present should, if not preferred, at least be safeguarded
because of their ability to disseminate the information concerning the
proceedings to an interested public much larger than those able to
attend.""'
In view of the potential litigation-breeding problems raised by the
CBS opinion, perhaps the most surprising aspect of the case is that it
neglected an obvious opportunity to uphold the rights of the press and
simultaneously maintain the status quo with respect to the authority of
the trial judge to control the press in the courtroom. The court could
have upheld the restriction against sketching in the courtroom, while
declaring the restrictions against sketching from memory outside the
courtroom to be impermissible. Such a holding would have preserved
109. District Judge Arnow, however, objected to sketching at least in part because he
felt a sketch "would be a representation that the public would accept or believe or accept
a representation of what actually went on .... " Brief for Appellant at 11-12, United
States v. CBS, 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974).
110. See Courier-Journal & Louisville Times v. Curtis, 335 S.W.2d 934 (Ky. Ct. App.
1960); United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 77, 123 N.E.2d 777, 778 (1954).
See also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974).
111. Johnson v. Simpson, 433 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
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the tenuous balance among the rights of the press, the rights of the
accused, and the duty of the judiciary to control conduct in the court-
room and its environs. 112  By tacitly extending the clear and present
danger standard to restraints on the press within the courtroom, the
Fifth Circuit may have unlocked a Pandora's box of litigation. The
problems inherent in the CBS decision seem to lend support to Chief
Judge Brown's observation in Dickinson presaging a confrontation
between the rights of the press and the rights of the accused: "[T]he
Day of Armageddon has not yet dawned on this great conflict
"113
112. For various professional viewpoints of this balance, see Dowd et al., A Sym-
posium on a Free Press and a Fair Trial, 11 VILL. L. REv. 677 (1966).
113. United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1972); see Washington
Post, Nov. 17, 1974, at c3, col. 1.
